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The Challenges and Obstacles of Post-Disaster Road 
Infrastructure Reconstruction in  
the Pre-Construction Phase 
 
Abstracts 
Purpose  
The reconstruction of road infrastructure in the post-disaster context require different 
approach when compared with road projects in the normal development context. Disaster 
recovery projects are seen as having their own unique identity, particularly due to stakeholder 
issues, resource challenges, capability issues, and even long-term reliability concerns. This 
paper invites a discussion regarding the challenges and obstacles identified in the 
reconstruction of road infrastructure in a post-disaster reconstruction setting, and focuses the 
discussion on the pre-construction phase. 
Design/ Methodology/ Approach 
The challenges and obstacles presented in this paper are based on the literature and the 
empirical evidence collected from the research in three case study districts in Aceh, 
Indonesia. Twenty-eight face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
stakeholders of road infrastructure at the local, provincial and national level, and represented 
by respondents from the public works, planning agency, disaster management agency, 
consultant, contractors, and donor agencies. The findings were triangulated with the literature 
and consulted with five experts in the road infrastructure and disaster reconstruction area.  
Findings 
The identified challenges and obstacles are divided into three groups of discussion; planning 
and programming, road design, and procurement. Whilst some of these challenges are not 
unique to post-disaster context, the scale of the risks had been undermined. 
Originality/ value 
This paper identifies the challenges and obstacles of a road project in the post-disaster setting 
from the pre-construction perspective. Identification of these challenges and obstacles may 
help improve the implementation of post-disaster road infrastructure reconstruction projects 
in future recovery projects, particularly in the developing world. 
Keywords 
Road infrastructure, post-disaster reconstruction, project management 
Introduction 
Disaster recovery projects are seen as having their own unique identity, particularly due to 
significant stakeholder issues (Haigh and Sutton, 2012, Baroudi and R. Rapp, 2014), resource 
challenges (Chang et al., 2010a, Chang et al., 2010b, Chang et al., 2011, Chang et al., 2012), 
capability issues (Crawford et al., 2012) and even long-term reliability concerns (Hayes and 
Hammons, 2000). Moreover, the level of success of a project is often reflected from the 
performance of three indicators: time, cost and quality. This means that successful project is 
completed within the specified project period, within budget allocation and as intended 
quality. However, achieving all success factors in a road construction project is not a 
straightforward effort. Often, at least one of the factors would be compromised to achieve the 
other performance indicators. In a disaster recovery, the complexity of road construction 
project is also intensified by the chaotic environment and the high level of uncertainties 
associated with the post disaster reconstruction context. In turn, these factors result in 
challenges that are unique, in context and scale, to post disaster reconstruction of road 
infrastructure. 
In major disasters, transport infrastructure appears to be one of the sectors which suffer the 
most damages and losses. Bappenas (2005) reported that losses and damages in infrastructure 
sector accounted for 19.7% of the total estimated losses and damages caused by the 
earthquake and tsunami in Aceh. In Sri Lanka, losses and damages in roads and 
transportation due to the tsunami accounted for 22% of the total needs (Asian Development 
Bank et al., 2005). The tsunami disaster in Aceh in 2004 caused damage to more than 2700 
km of roads. Within the four year reconstruction period, more than 3600 km of road were 
reconstructed by the national government and donor agencies working in the reconstruction 
of road infrastructure in Aceh (Sihombing, 2009). This paper, which is based on the first 
author’s PhD research in three case study districts in Aceh, is focused on the challenges and 
obstacles identified in the post-disaster reconstruction of the road infrastructure during the 
pre-construction phase. The identified challenges and obstacles are grouped into three main 
categories; planning and programming, road design, and procurement. The planning and 
programming phase refers to the preparation of blueprint of the overall reconstruction and 
program coordination. The road design phase refers to the process of designing the road 
technical specification. The procurement phase accordingly refers to challenges and obstacles 
identified in the procurement process.  
Methodology 
Twenty-eight face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted with the representatives 
of the road infrastructure stakeholders at the national, provincial and local level. The twenty-
eight respondents comprise of eighteen respondents from three case study districts in the west 
coast area of Aceh province and ten policy makers from the provincial and national level. The 
basic profile and distribution of the interview respondents is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 – Basic Profile of the Respondents 
Institution Types Total 
Public works 9 
Consultant 4 
Contractors 3 
Planning agency 5 
Disaster management agency 3 
Donor organisation 2 
Transport agency 1 
Secretary of province 1 
Total  28 
 
The respondents for the interviews were selected using a combination of purposive sampling 
and snowballing method. Semi-structured interviews were conducted in a face-to-face 
approach. Each of the interviewees was briefed about the objective of the study and was 
advised to subscribe to the Participant Consent Form. Each interview was conducted for 
approximately one hour. The interviews were transcribed into NVivo 10, and were coded 
using multiple stages approach; open coding, axial coding and selective coding process. The 
data was analysed using content analysis technique with the aid of the same software. The 
findings of the study were triangulated through consultation with five experts in the subjects 
of post-disaster reconstruction and road infrastructure management as well as with the 
literature (the basic profiles of the experts are presented in Table 2). 
Table 2 – Profile of respondents for the Expert validation semi-structured interviews 
Code Professional Background 
Val01 Academic 
Val02 Consultant 
Val03 Consultant 
Val04 Academic 
Val05 Consultant 
Discussion 
This paper identifies challenges and obstacles of road reconstruction project in the pre-
construction phase. The following sections will present the discussions according to the 
project phase.  
Planning and programming 
The discussion of the challenges and obstacles in planning and programming process covers 
the preparation of the blueprint for the overall reconstruction of road infrastructure, as well as 
the coordination of the reconstruction process. The summary of the challenges and obstacles 
at the planning and programming process is presented in Table 3.  
Table 3 – Challenges and obstacles in the planning and programming process 
Project Phase Challenges and Obstacles 
Planning and programming Fewer aid agencies focused on road infrastructure 
Increased material price 
Project delay 
Blueprint errors 
limited preparation time 
no project prioritisation, inclusion of almost all road 
networks 
Political pressure 
political pressure affect project location and budget 
allocation 
Competing donors makes coordinating and project 
distribution difficult 
 
Hayat and Amaratunga (2011) argue that the reconstruction of road infrastructure in the post-
disaster context is immediately challenged by the relatively fewer donor organisations 
working in the road sector compared with other sector such as housing and livelihood. Even 
though road infrastructure condition affected the speed and cost of aid distribution and the 
overall recovery process, very few aid agencies provided sufficient focus and fund allocation 
for the reconstruction of road infrastructure. Chang et al. (2011) argue that many aid agencies 
working in the tsunami reconstruction in Aceh undermined the importance of road 
infrastructure by not including it in their initial recovery plans, which resulted in project 
delays and increased material price.  
Furthermore, the blueprint for the reconstruction of the affected areas was prepared in a very 
short time (3 months). Accordingly, inaccuracies were found and the blueprint included a 
number of programs not related to earthquake and tsunami disaster. For instance, almost all 
national roads and provincial roads were included in the blueprint that it overlapped with 
those under the responsibility of the Directorate General of Highways and the Aceh 
administration as part of their regular development programs (Sihombing, 2009). On the 
other hand, as further explained by Sihombing (2009) there were several most urgent 
programs excluded from the blueprint, such as the construction of escape airstrips in the 
remote and strategic locations in Aceh. As a consequence, the disaster reconstruction 
implementation agency, The Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh Nias 
(BRR), had to abandon the blueprint and worked based on what they see fit in the actual field 
condition. Accordingly, in the BRR Mid Term Review report (MTR), adjustments were made 
in the reconstruction plan, and that the reconstruction projects were grouped into four 
quadrant of MTR matrix (Subekti, 2009). The MTR matrix is shown in Figure 2 
Implemented, exceeding 
targets of master plan
I
Implemented; below targets 
of master plan due to priority, 
efficiency, conditions, and 
needs on the ground
II
III
In master plan, but not 
implemented, due to priority 
and efficiency
IV
Implemented, although not 
mentioned in master plan, 
due to priority and needs on 
the ground
 
Figure 1 – The four Quadrant of the MTR (Subekti, 2009) 
At the programming phase, the study identifies that the distribution of project location and 
budget allocation was also challenged by the political pressure, conflict of interest, and 
competition among the donors and stakeholders. It was suggested that political pressure from 
the parliament member and high-rank officials, for instance, affected the decision-making in 
determining project location. On the one hand, it was acknowledged that the political 
pressure to disperse project location was necessary as a means to ensure the distribution of 
wealth. However, there were cases where such pressure stem from the conflict of interest. As 
illustrated by CS04  
“The challenge was that too many road projects were forcefully requested to be done 
in certain locations… Why do they have to be there? After we did field observations, 
we found that there was the house of the head of parliament, or it was the Regent’s 
village. That happened.” – CS04 
Furthermore, the great number of donors working in the post-disaster reconstruction made 
coordination and distribution of work areas difficult, particularly when more than one donors 
interested in working in the same areas and that there were changes of reconstruction 
coordination authority at the initial reconstruction phase. In the initial period of the 
reconstruction, Sugiarto (2009) described how the transfer of authority for reconstruction 
coordination from the National Development Agency to the BRR resulted in a number of 
projects’ postponement,  which was due to changes in the reconstruction procurement policy 
and the reluctance of big donor organisation to coordinate with the BRR for their project 
implementation. Miscommunication and coordination problem also occurred resulting from 
the lack of donors’ representative offices in Aceh.  
With regards to donors’ competing interests, Sugiarto (2009) describes a case where the 
government of Japan insisted to build the whole road network between Banda Aceh, Calang 
and Meulaboh in the west coast area. However, the request was refused as the road section 
between Banda Aceh and Calang had been allocated for the USAID. The dispute resulted in 
project commencement delays, until it was covered by Japan national media and raised the 
Japanese public’s attention.   
The reconstruction coordination was also challenged by the various conditions that came with 
donors’ donation. For instance, the Governments of Germany and Japan identified that some 
of their projects in certain sectors had to be carried out by their own implementing agencies. 
The disbursement of funds for these projects, even though accounted for in the national 
budgetary system, were carried out by the particular donors and therefore outside the 
authority of the coordinating agency, BRR. This scheme was also known as on-budget/ off-
treasury projects (Subekti, 2009).  
To help with coordination and reporting of project progress, the BRR developed Recovery 
Aceh-Nias Database (RAND), which registered all projects carried out in Aceh and Nias. The 
database was accessible for update by the respective NGOs and donor organisations, and was 
made as one of the requirement for the expatriate personnel to obtain their working permit. In 
some cases, several NGOs refused to coordinate and report their progress with the BRR by 
ignoring the need to register and update the RAND database, which affected the overall 
reconstruction coordination. Consequently, the BRR did not include and acknowledge such 
projects in the disaster recovery reconstruction progress report. The challenges and obstacles 
in the planning and programming phase have been discussed in this section. Accordingly, the 
next section will present issues related to the road design process. 
Road design 
The summary of challenges and obstacles in the design process is presented in Table 4. Even 
though the disaster recovery blueprint indicated the list of projects for the post-disaster 
reconstruction, it did not come with a design plan and inaccuracies were also found. As 
indicated earlier, the disaster reconstruction resulted in nearly 1000kms more road networks 
than what was destroyed by the earthquake and tsunami in Aceh. It was suggested that such 
an extensive number resulted from adopting and implementing the build back better principle 
where rehabilitation and reconstruction was not only applied to the damaged road section, but 
also to the connecting network. However, the number was also affected by the inaccuracies of 
the initial road network length measurement indicated in the blueprint resulting from the 
limited preparation time as well as the severe condition of the project locations. Accordingly, 
there were many cases where the project cost escalated and the initial project budget 
allocation was no longer sufficient to accommodate the actual needs. One of the solutions to 
deal with the project cost escalation was to reduce the project’s scope of work. For instance, 
many of the World Bank’s IRFF road reconstruction projects were long sections of roads that 
were broken down into smaller packages of road segments. Some packages included the 
construction of culverts or bridges. Accordingly, to maintain the targeted quality of the road 
structures within the initial budget ceiling, changes in the scope of works often resulted in the 
reduction of the road length or the omission of some project items. The latter option may 
include the deferral of bridge construction into future projects. Consequently, many of the 
projects resulted in some sections being left with ‘untouched’ parts at the end of the road 
segment while some others may have a newly built road with temporary wooden bridges in 
between. Nevertheless, these gaps were rectified in the next projects.  
Table 4 – Challenges and obstacles in the design process 
Project Phase Challenges and Obstacles 
Road design Inaccurate design 
limited time 
harsh working environment 
Land acquisition process 
Customary land title 
Large number of land parcels 
Conflicting donor’s policy  
Over-standard design 
prolong maintenance needs 
donors' pride 
 
With regards to planning and design, Sihombing (2009) acknowledges that providing a 
design plan in an emergency condition was impossible due to the time constraint and pressure 
to act quickly. Accordingly, a design review concept was adopted by the BRR, which 
provided only the basic planning concept, tender documents, and the estimated project value, 
leaving the details of the design to the awarded party. This was meant to accelerate most of 
the reconstruction projects, and was claimed to be an effective method (Sihombing, 2009). 
However, road reconstruction required a different approach and obtaining a ‘final’ design is 
an urgent priority for the commencement of the land acquisition process. As a result, there 
were significant delays in the road reconstruction project in Aceh. Some of the main causes 
of the delay were that road design and implementation plan had not been approved by the 
time it was needed. Changes to the design and scope of projects are not uncommon in road 
construction projects, both in the developed and developing countries, which is considered to 
be one of the most significant causes of project delays (Kaliba et al., 2009). In Aceh, this 
issue, along with frequent changes to the project scope due to budget thresholds and 
disagreement over the final road alignment (USAID, 2006) were the additional causes of the 
project delays. 
In many locations, most of the road sections had been submerged under the seawater, 
requiring changes to the road layout and the need to acquire land. The challenges and 
obstacles in the land acquisition process are summarised by Hayat and Amaratunga (2011). 
They describe that the main challenges in the land acquisition process stem from the large 
number of land parcels to be acquired; more than 3000 land parcels in the west coast alone, 
and the existence of two types of land title in Indonesia; those formally registered in the 
national land agency and those acknowledged by the customary law. While anticipated, the 
significant amount of time and other difficulties related to acquiring land were 
underestimated (USAID, 2007). In the tsunami affected areas, many landowners and up to 
30% of government personnel as well as offices responsible for the land acquisition process 
had also been victims of the event (BRR and International Partners, 2005, Fitzpatrick, 2006). 
Furthermore, at the project level, the study identified that the use of over-standard design 
consequently gives a long-term impact to the local governments who are responsible to 
provide the maintenance. The over-standard design refers to the higher structural quality 
pavement standard relative to the local governments’ experience and common practice at that 
time. The over-standard design is accordingly more expensive to build. Practically, in Aceh, 
this refers to the Hot Mix Asphalt pavement type. Respondent Val05 suggested that the use of 
HMA was affected by ‘pride competition’ between donor organisations which utilised the 
reconstruction project as a ‘display’ of their works and aid donation.  
Nevertheless, the use of HMA was also supported by the technical and economic rationale, in 
that the HMA provides better surface quality and durability which may then prolong the 
future maintenance needs. In turn, it was expected to help reduce the local governments’ 
maintenance backlog problems. Unfortunately, in the long run, the study identified that the 
wide application of HMA in the reconstruction process resulted in local governments 
undermining the various advantages and disadvantages of different road types. The local 
governments are ‘abandoning’ the idea of having macadam and gravel roads in their districts, 
for instance, as they used to have prior to the tsunami reconstruction. Consequently, the 
annual budget allocation in the road sector was focused and channelled for the new road 
projects with HMA surface or upgrading the existing macadam and gravel roads to HMA, 
with little attention given to the maintenance needs.  
As the challenges and obstacles in the road design process have been presented, the following 
section will discuss issues identified in the procurement phase.  
Procurement  
At the pre-construction phase, the procurement process experienced the greatest number of 
challenges and obstacles. As shown in Table 5, the challenges and obstacles can be grouped 
into local resources, bid competition, contractor capacity, and regulatory arrangement. 
The procurement process was immediately challenged by the lack of personnel capable and 
legible for organising and administering the procurement process. As stipulated in the 
Presidential Decree no 80/2003, the procurement personnel must be civil servant with 
procurement certification. However, the number of civil servants with procurement 
certification was very limited. Accordingly, to help solve this issue, BRR regularly and 
frequently provided training and certification test for their personnel, as well as for the local 
government personnel.  
Table 5 – Challenges and obstacles in the procurement process 
Project Phase Challenges and Obstacles 
Procurement. 
 
Local resources availability 
limited personnel with procurement capacity and 
qualification 
Great numbers of project, limited contractors 
Poor contractor capacity 
seasonal contractor with strong political support 
unfamiliarity with international bidding requirements 
external contractors’ reluctance to work in Aceh due to 
conflict and threats 
Bid competition 
threats and corrupt practices 
unfair competition - collusion among AMP owner 
Regulatory arrangement 
involvement of international consultant in the procurement 
process against national regulation 
Indigenous people protection 
The absence of post-disaster specific exemption 
 
In addition to procurement personnel capacity issue, the reconstruction was also challenged 
by the limited capacity of the contractors available locally. This condition was affected by the 
fact that many construction companies and their personnel were affected and killed by the 
disaster, and that a great number of reconstruction projects took place within a relatively 
same period of time. Furthermore, after the tsunami, it was identified that there were many 
new and seasonal contractors competing for the reconstruction projects through political 
support. Many of the new contractors were arguably lacked both the skills and experience in 
construction, and however pushed aside contractors with skills and experience but without 
political backup. Such a condition was illustrated by respondent CS06, 
“Now, fishermen becomes contractors, and contractors go fishing (as there are no jobs)” 
The CS06 comment’s illustrated his view that inexperienced contractors flooded the industry 
and pushed aside the existing contractors.  
Moreover, Aceh was in a prolonged conflict of nearly 30 years before the peace agreement 
achieved in 2005. However, the security and safety threats remained on the ground, which 
hindered the opportunity and willingness of external contractor to work in Aceh. To better 
ensure the security and safety of project implementation, many of the external contractors 
established partnerships with the local contractors. The partnership between them occurred in 
the form of joint-operation scheme, as a contractor and supplier, or as a contractor and 
subcontractors. 
The procurement phase was also challenged by the unfamiliarity of the contractors with the 
international bidding procedure, which frequently resulted in delays and dispute. As the 
reconstruction of Aceh involved many international donor organisations, certain projects had 
to refer to the international bidding procedure. Indonesian procurement regulation 
(Presidential Decree 80/2003) also stipulates that if any conflicting regulations occur between 
Indonesia and donor regulations in projects that are partially or fully funded under loan or 
grant schemes, donor regulation would then prevail. Accordingly, problems due to 
unfamiliarity with certain procedures and requirements inevitably occurred. For instance, in 
the initial phase of the USAID project, the implementation plan proposed by the Indonesian 
contractor, PT Wijaya Karya (WIKA), was not approved due to its non-compliance with the 
US requirement which caused delays to the project commencement (USAID, 2006). This 
regulation has been since amended a number of times with the latest being the Presidential 
Regulation no 54/2010 and its second amendment, Presidential Regulation no 70/2012, where 
conflicting regulation will now need prior negotiation and agreement.  
During the post-disaster reconstruction period, the number of reconstruction projects and the 
growing number of contractors in the affected areas consequently lead to fierce competition 
between the contractors in winning the projects. This condition consequently resulted in 
threats and corrupt practices in the procurement process. As previously discussed, joint-
operation scheme was adopted by many contractors working in Aceh. Some of the problems 
resulted from such collaborations were recorded in details by Sihombing (2009), when a 
contractor who submitted the most expensive bid was adamant about winning the project and 
turned into a rage when there seemed to be no chance of winning. In another case, Sihombing 
(2009) highlights a case where a national company lost a procurement tender due to the local 
partners’ lack of experience in the procurement of heavy vehicle equipment, and forcefully 
tried to justify their bid position. Accordingly, in order to avoid threats from the bid 
participants who were eager to win, the procurement committee had to work literally out of 
the public reach by moving the selection process to another city. 
Furthermore, in public procurement, corrupt practices may occur in the form of awarding 
contracts to the best briber instead of based on the best price-quality value. Such practice may 
result in higher contract value or purchase of unnecessary items (Søreide, 2005), or fraud 
resulting from discrepancies between amounts paid to suppliers for goods and the quantity of 
goods delivered (Oxfam, cited in Schultz and Søreide, 2006).  Ewins et al. (2006) suggest 
that corruption risk in the humanitarian action are among others affected by the existing 
corruption and transparency level, value of relief activities, and the condition of the affected 
area. With regard to the transparency level, the Transparency International lists Indonesia as 
the 114 out of the 117 countries surveyed in its 2013 global corruption perception report 
(Transparency International, 2013). 
After the peace agreement, the ex-combatants returned to the community and formed an 
association, called Aceh Transition Committee (KPA). At the village level, the KPA is called 
Sagoe (corner). To ensure that the project could be implemented well and without disruption, 
a personal approach and agreement with the Sagoe leaders was frequently required. As a 
result, the KPA members would generally be involved in the project as the contractors’ 
personnel or as the suppliers for the project. Respondent CS10 implicitly revealed that this 
practice was well-coordinated and well-organised by the KPA at the higher level. He said  
“Since the ‘Sagoe’ might have been directed by the KPA regarding the project in their 
village, the contractors would later need to recruit some of the local KPA members in 
the project. Whether as a night guard... or if they have a business, might also be as the 
suppliers. So we share (the works).” – CS10  
Whilst CS10’s comment above illustrates how the security and safety issue would affect the 
implementation of a project on the ground, the influences and pressures from the KPA also 
affected the project tender process. CS10 further described that he had to coordinate with the 
KPA and distributed the construction work packages between the KPA members. As CS10 
explained 
“We always coordinated with them (KPA). We explained (to the leaders) so that they 
could convey the message to their members that we are all ‘equal’ (together). We 
would distribute (the projects) in the tender process. So there would be no one saying 
that I have to win such and such project, or this must be mine. What happened was that 
we arranged them through the (formal) procedure, through tender.” CS10 
Another issue identified was with regards to the requirement of having an Asphalt Mixing 
Plant (AMP), or supported by an AMP company, for a contractor to participate in a road 
project tender. Whilst such requirement was necessary to ensure that participating contractors 
were capable of delivering the project, the study identified that the limited number of AMP in 
the affected areas resulted in at least two consequences. The first consequence was that the 
requirement of AMP reduced the opportunity for small contractors to participate in a road 
project tender. On the one hand, this condition helped filter-out contractors with lack of 
experience or equipment support. On the other hand, however, such requirement did not 
necessarily resulted as intended. Many contractors who did not have an AMP were able to 
participate in the project tender, as long as they were supported by AMP companies. 
Nevertheless, such a support was normally given under a condition that AMP related works 
(i.e. road pavement) were carried out by the AMP companies, with a price that could be the 
same with or more than what was included and allocated by the contractors’ in their bid. 
Whilst the price had been normally agreed upon prior to bid submission, there were cases 
where the AMP companies changed the price after the contractor win the project. The 
contractors would then need to compensate their loss from the AMP related works by 
justifying their project budget and specification of other works, often by reducing the quality. 
The other consequence of the AMP support requirement was that AMP owners were taking 
turn in winning a project. Such a practice was locally known as arisan, where AMP owners 
formed collusive collaboration by not providing support to contractors without AMPs and 
distribute the road projects between themselves by pre-arranging the bid price. 
The study also identifies that the reconstruction process was also challenged by the regulatory 
arrangement, which was not suitable and applicable for the post-disaster condition or 
conflicted with the donor organisations’ regulations. For instance, the World Bank required 
the involvement of international consultant in the procurement of their co-funded projects. 
Such a requirement was not accommodated and allowed in the Indonesian law, as the law did 
not even allow any non-civil servant personnel involved in the procurement committee 
(Presidential Decree, 2003). Furthermore, the World Bank also implemented the indigenous 
people protection policy. This policy required the assurance that people affected by the 
project would not be disadvantaged. The policy included paying damages or relocation of the 
affected communities or businesses. Whilst Indonesian law accommodated the need to pay 
damages to the affected communities through the land acquisition process, the Indonesian 
law did not recognise paying damages or relocation of affected people which illegally 
occupied the land. These condition eventually resulted in disputes and project 
commencement delays. In many cases, problems occurring from the regulatory arrangement 
were due to the lack of disaster-specific regulations and laws. Regulations and laws which are 
produced for normal context cannot be simply applied and implemented in the post-disaster 
reconstruction context, where the actual field condition is affected by the severe site 
condition, chaotic environment, and the pressure for a speedy recovery. Some of the 
problems resulting from conflicting regulations were solved through discussion and 
amendment of regulation and laws. However, many of the issues resulted in disputes and 
delays, which were often unnecessary and avoidable should disaster-specific regulations were 
in place.  
Conclusion  
This paper presents a discussion on the various challenges and obstacles identified in the 
reconstruction of road infrastructure during the pre-construction phase. These challenges and 
obstacles, separated into three main phases – planning and programming, road design, and 
procurement, are identified from the literature and empirical evidence collected from semi-
structured interviews with twenty-eight respondents in three case study districts in Aceh and 
five experts in the road infrastructure and post-disaster reconstruction subject. At the 
planning and programming phase, the issues stem to limited number of aid agencies working 
in the road sector, error in the blueprint preparation, and political pressure in determining 
project location and budget allocation. From the road design perspective, the study identifies 
challenges and obstacles resulting from inaccurate design, the extensive land acquisition 
process, and the wide application of over-standard design. At the procurement phase, the 
reconstruction of road infrastructure was challenged by the limited local resources 
availability, poor contractor capacity and unhealthy competition between contractors, as well 
as issues resulting from conflicting regulation.  
The list of challenges and obstacles identified in this paper is not exhaustive and open for 
discussion. It is acknowledged that each disaster may pose different challenges to its recovery 
process. Nevertheless, this paper provides a guidance to assist with the implementation of 
road infrastructure reconstruction project in the future.  
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